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SUBJECT-IVE AND OBJECTIVE 
Peter Railton 
I 
Morality is different - but how? Moral judgement certainly differs 
in various ways from ordinary judgement about the garden-variety 
objects in the world around us. A distinguished line of philosophers 
have argued that these differences are crystallised in a difference in 
the ver). nature and function of moral language. And yet grammar 
textbooks make no mention of a systematic distinction between 
moral and non-moral language, evcn at  the level of deep structure. 
Indeed, moral language docs not in its grammatical or logical 
bchaviour betray the least sign of being anything other than 
ordinary. 
Increasingly, philosophers are inclined to take this at face value. 
Moral judgements, for example, are held to make assertions that 
can be true or false in our ordinary sense of these terms. 
Increasingly, too, philosophers are inclined to accept all the 
platitudes that follow from this. Thus, since ‘truth is correspondence 
to the facts’, moral truth is correspondence to the facts, too. 
Ordinary discourse supports us here: ‘The fact is that I’ve 
promised to go and so I’m obliged to be there’ is not a quirky way 
of expressing oneself. It even is deemed harmless to countenance 
talk of ‘moral properties’ (in ordinary speech one would more likely 
hear ‘moral qualities’) and ‘moral facts’ (‘moral circumstances’). 
This sort of talk seems to assume nothing about whether such 
properties or facts are sui generis, for example. 
Perhaps, then, morality is different but moral discourse as such is 
not. And perhaps our willingness to talk in terms of moral 
properties and facts simply registers our readiness to apply the 
terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ to moral judgements. As such, it might be 
considered innocent of any significant metaphysical implications. 
Its real basis would be seen as lying in our discursive practices in 
morality, our tendencies to deliberate and disagree in distinctive 
ways - to make arguments, to insist upon consistency, to adduce 
evidence, and so on, Beyond this, no purported insight into the real 
composition of the world is claimed. 
If moral judgement is therefore factual in a thorough-going but 
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mundane sense, where might the supposed difference between 
moral judgements and ordinary worldly judgements lie? 
Let us consider a recent suggestion. It is one thing to judge, 
another to reify the object ofjudgement. We must always be on 
guard when analysing language - moral and non-moral alike - 
against gratuitous reification. Sometimes reification strikes us as 
quite appropriate. For example, most of us are realists about the 
external world of mid-sized physical objects, about other minds, 
and about the past. But many find reification and realism suspect 
in other domains that nonetheless are typically accepted as factual - 
mathematics, modality, universals, and so on. 
The question of realism vs. anti-realism has therefore seemed to 
some a promising way to understand how morality might be 
different even though moral discourse is factual. There is, after all, 
a lot of ground between recognising that a discourse is factual and 
adopting a realist attitude toward the substantives and properties 
occurring in it.’ First, there is always the possibility that a non-literal 
interpretation of these terms will seem most appropriate: philo- 
sophical behaviourists argue, for example, that mental statements 
are equivalent to claims about actual and possible behaviour. This 
translation would preserve the cognitive grammar of mentalistic 
discourse and yield a domain of potential psychological facts, but it 
would hardly deserve the name ‘mental (or psychological) realism’. 
Second, there is the further possibility that an error theory about the 
discourse will seem on reflection most appropriate: moral state- 
ments when literally interpreted, might be seen as making claims 
or presuppositions - such as the existence of a teleological ‘natural 
order’ - that simply never hold true in the actual world.2 In error 
theories we encounter a form of anti-realism that owes nothing to a 
non-factualist or non-literal interpretation of moral language. 
Many philosophers, however, want neither of these options. 
They want to say that they find at least some substantive moral 
judgements, literally understood, to be true. Chattel slavery is 
unjust. The infliction of pain upon others for one’s own amusement 
is wrong.3 Yet some of these same philosophers want to counten- 
’ I a m  indebted hcrr to Gidron Roscn. Src P. Kailton and C. Rosen, ‘Realism’. in J. Kim 
iilld E.  Sosil ( t d s . ) .  T/w Hlrukwuli C m / m h  lo .\/?/o/i/!prif\ (0s f i ) r t l :  Hlarktvcll. 1991). 
The bcst-known cxamplc ofan  rrror throry in the moral caw is that ofJ. I.. Mackir, 
ELhic.c: lnvenlznl Rzghf and W’ron‘q (1.ondon: Prnguin, 197 i ) .  
’’ It is not important hcrc whcthcr wc undcrstand thcsc judgcmcnts as absolutc or prima 
Jarie. Evcn a moral rcalist can, for cxamplr, cspousc a thcory ofprimafucie moral reasons, or  a 
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ance moral facts only so far - in particular, they wish to distance 
themselves from moral realism. 
One way to avoid moral metaphysics while accepting the idea 
that at least some moral judgements, literally interpreted, are true 
would be to adopt non-literalism about truth itself (at least as i t  
figures in moral discourse). But this option has already been 
foreclosed in our present discussion, since we are supposing that 
when the term ‘truth’ is employed in moral discourse it has its 
familiar sense, the same sense in which it figures in discourse about 
those parts of the world toward which we more readily adopt a 
realist attitude. Moreover, if there is a difference of metaphysical 
interest between moral facts and facts about garden-variety objects, 
we have been assuming, this is not because ‘fact’ has a different 
meaning in the two cases4 
Let us call Literal Truth the position that at least some substantive 
moral statements, taken literally, are literally true. What space 
remains between Literal Truth and moral r e a l i ~ m ? ~  Perhaps the 
space is only rhetorical - there is nothing a moral realist could 
legitimately want beyond what is contained in Literal Truth. That 
would be reminiscent of a familiar realidanti-realist dialectic in 
which the anti-realist places the burden upon the realist to say 
what more could be at stake. But in this case the dialectic is 
different. For here it seems as if the party with the stronger interest 
in showing there to be something genuine at issue is not the realist 
(who accepts Literal Truth as a matter of course) but the moral- 
anti-realist-who-nonetheless-accepts-Literal-Truth. This sort of 
anti-realist wants to be able to distinguish morality from areas 
of inquiry that he thinks to be more properly informative about the 
shape of the real world. 
A qualification is in order. Given the (uncontroversial) super- 
venience of moral discourse, to insist that at least some moral 
judgements, literally interpreted, are true is to commit oneself to 
thcory that involvcs vagucncss and indctcrminacy. Wr cannot saddlc the moral realist with 
standards of absolutcncss or ‘rational drtcrminacy’ wc do not imposc upon such ‘hard’ 
domains of inquiry as biology or gcology. (Just which gcnctic change madc for the first 
mcmbcr of Murnmaliu~’) Indccd, it is commonly argued in philosophy of scicncc that thc 
choicc of a fundamental physical thcory is not ‘rationally determinate’, cvcn givcn idcal 
cvidcncc. 
’ Obviously, i t  would not hclp at this point to cmbracc a global anti-realism about factual 
discourse, sincc prcciscly thc idca is to  work out whcn a realist attitudc toward a factual 
domain ofdiscoursc is srnsiblc and whcn not. 
’ None, according to somc commrntators. Scc for cxamplc G. Say-McCord’s  
introduction to his E.r.iuyr on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell Univrrsity Press, 1989). 
@ nlackwrll Puhlishrrs I.td. 1995 
PETER RAII .TON 262 
the existence in the real world - where else? - of some or other non- 
moral states of affairs in virtue of which the moral judgements hold. 
So Literal Truth by itself commits one to the idea that moral 
discourse reveals something of the shape of the real world after all: 
the world must be such as to underwrite at least some bona fide 
moral facts. 
That could be very metaphysically informative - or not - 
depending upon the substantive content of moral claims, a question 
that cannot be bracketed in discussions of the significance of Literal 
Truth and that we ourselves cannot a n y  longer postpone. One 
potential attraction of a position that combines Literal Truth with 
anti-realism about morality is that it might provide a way of 
capturing what has seemed to many right about emotivism while 
avoiding the imputation of a non-standard grammar to moral 
discourse and the attendant exaggerated attention to non-cognitive 
states. Emotivists explained the facdvalue distinction by arguing 
that moral discourse has a grammatically subjective character - 
unlike ordinary objectual discourse it functions primarily to express 
the speaker's emotions rather than to describe states of affairs. 
Philosophers who combine Literal Truth with anti-realism will 
reject this grammatical way of accommodating the subjective 
aspect of moral discourse and the associated view of value claims as 
non-factual. But they can adopt the emotivists' re-orientation of 
moral philosophy away from the idea that moral judgement 
passively reports objectual states worthy of reification and toward 
the idea that i t  essentially involves thc reactions and actions of 
subjects. This re-orientation should inhibit reification and realism, 
even if one grants Literal Truth. By contrast, various judgements 
purporting to describe the external world, other minds, and the 
past can be made seemingly without any necessary engagement on 
our part as subjects, which explains why reification and realism 
come much more naturally to them in the wake of Literal Truth. 
Consider in this light what tm70 philosophers have said recently 
about what realism would appear to involve in the moral case. John 
Rawls characterizes the realist's conception of moral inquiry as: 
the search for moral truth interpreted as fixed by a prior and 
independent order of objects and relations, whether natural or 
divine, an order apart and distinct from how we conceive 
ourselves.6 
" Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Thcory', , /nurnal of F'hilmophy 77 (1980), 
p. 519. Note also the discussion i n  his more rcccnt book, Poiitical I.ibrrali.rtn (New York: 
Columbia Univcrsity Prcss, 1993), Iccturc 3. 
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And in a similar vein, Crispin Wright writes in concluding a 
discussion of moral rcalism using a comparison with realism in 
science: 
[according to the realist] the real progress of science is measured 
by the extent to which our theories represent a reality whose 
nature owes nothing to our natures or the standards that inform 
our conception of reasonable discourse about it.7 
If a realist conception of moral facts must be one in which they are 
‘prior and independent’, or ‘a reality whose nature owes nothing to 
our natures’, then i t  would be clear why space remains between 
Literal Truth and moral realism: an anti-realist could claim that 
moral facts lack the metaphysical independence from human 
subjectivity that would sustain a rcalist attitude toward them. This 
would not be a defect in the moral facts themselves, but rather a 
ground for recognising that realist reification is not always licensed 
by a willingness to speak literally of truth and fact. 
The question now becomes: Does a realist attitude necessarily 
bring with it a commitment to this sort of metaphysical independ- 
ence? 
Certainly some forms of realism do owe their distinctive character 
to this sort of commitment. Such paradigms of realism as realism 
about the external world, realism about the theoretical entities of 
natural science, and Platonism about mathematical objects have as 
a central component the idea that the entities or properties posited 
are ‘prior to and independent of any condition or experience of 
subjects. In that sense, they are radically non-subjective. Since 
‘subjective’ is a notoriously slippery term, let us coin the technical 
term ‘subject-ive’ (with a hyphen) to express the notion of 
that which is essentiall). connected with the existence or experi- 
ences of subjects, i.e., beings possessing minds and points of view, 
bcing capable of forming thoughts and intentions. These paradigms 
of realism are, in our hiccoughing ncologism, radically nonsuh- 
ject-ive. 
Similarly, many paradigm forms of anti-realism take the sub- 
ject-ive as their point of departure: phenomenalists interprct 
physical object language in terms of actual or possible observations; 
observationalists do the same with the theoretical language of 
’ \%’right. Truth and O b j e t t i i i ! y  (Cambridgr: Harvard University Prrss, 1992), p. 200. 
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science; conventionalists trace the nature of numbers as well as the 
force of the logical ‘must’ to the practices of the mathematical 
community; nominalists see universals as linguistic rather than 
metaphysical; and atheists treat God as a mere idealisation of 
human characteristics (‘The secret of the Holy Family is the 
human family’, according to the Feuerbachian). I t  should be 
emphasised, however, that subject-ive does not mean subjective, at 
least insofar as that term is used derogatorily to suggest a domain 
without standards, where arbitrary opinion takes the place of 
judgement. Phenomenalists and observationalists have character- 
istically emphasised such standards of epistemic objectivity as 
intersubjective agreement and reliance upon rational credence 
functions. What these views reject in realism is not its interest in 
objectivity, but (what we might call) its tendency toward 
objectiiity - its reification of a domain as independent of sub- 
ject-ivi ty. 
Radical nonsubject-ivity, where it can sensibly be sustained, 
does help to secure several seeming hallmarks of realist thought. If 
a domain of entities and properties D is independent of experience, 
for example, then it has at least three interesting kinds of 
explanatory potential. First, it can in principle support non- 
circular explanations of the patterns in our experience - we see a 
tree in the quad because one is there, and not vice versa. This 
corresponds to a certain notion of univocal ‘order of explanation’.* 
Second, D can in principle support explanations unmediated by 
any sort of experience - a tree falling unnoticed in the quad 
nonetheless leaves an elongated depression in the earth. This, taken 
together with the first, establishes an impressive ‘width of 
cosmological role’ for D.’ And third, these two kinds of explanatory 
potential enable us t o  see clearly how explanations invoking the 
properties and entities of D can in principle pass an ‘Attitude Test’ 
of a kind suggested by Gilbert Harman: if we were to replace 
reference to these properties and entities in our explanations with 
reference only to our attitudes about D combined with associated 
non-D facts, genuine explanatory information would be lost. l o  
’ Compare the discussion of‘ordcr of’dctcrmination’ and its rrlation to realism, in thc 
essays by M. Johnston and C.  Wright in J. Haldane and C. Wright (cds.), Renltcy, 
Repre.rentation and Projection (Oxford: Oxford Univcrsity Prcss, 1992). 
‘I This uscful term is duc to Crispin Wright. Scc his Truth and Objectiz,t[v, ch. 5. 
‘‘I Scc the discussion i n  rh .  I of C,. Harman, Thr Nature nJ’.tloraliQ (New York: Oxford 
Univrrsity Prcss, 3977). T h r  notion of‘cxplanatory information’ is roughly this: information 
about what a comprehensive explanatory history would contain. For discussion, scc 
P. Railton, ‘Probability, Explanation, and Information’, Synthe.re 48 (1981). 
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(Contrast the atheist's view of religious explanations: world history 
has been affected in countless ways by religious belief and practice, 
and religious conviction has led many to have experiences which 
they call miracles or sensations of the presence of God, but no 
actual deity has ever caused any perception or even the swerving of 
a single atom. For the atheist, then, if religious explanations were 
replaced systematically with explanation in terms of religious 
attitudes and collateral non-religious phenomena, no genuine 
explanation would be left out. The theistic realist, by contrast, 
would insist that in many cases no such explanatory replacement is 
possible.) These three notions of explanatory potential give us an 
idea of the particular sort of explanatory pay-off that positing a 
domain of nonsubject-ive entities and properties can yield, and 
which might well make such a posit worthwhile. 
It is natural to associate realism with this sort of radical 
nonsubject-ivity. The realist is said to want entities and properties 
that are 'out there' in the world, independent of the projections of 
our beliefs and indifferent to the tossings and turnings of our 
imaginations - entities and properties that are there anyway. I '  This 
association bodes ill for the moral case. We have a degree of 
confidence - perhaps even justified confidence? - that we have 
some idea of what it would be like for rocks and trees, quasars and 
molecules, heat and mean molecular kinetic energy to be 'prior to 
and independent of all subject-ivity. By contrast, the very idea that 
there might be a realm of moral properties subsisting independent 
of all subject-ive phenomena - all facts about human nature or 
experience, say - would be philosophical adventurism of the first 
order. Thus interpreted, moral realism is a non-starter. 
IIZ 
But is this train of thought compelling? It overlooks the seeming 
platitude that the nature of realism about any domain depends 
upon the nature of that domain itself. What do  we imagine the 
entities or properties of this domain to be like? If there were such 
things, what would they do? The question of realism about a 
domain D of purported entities and properties cannot be treated in 
a purely generic way - we must ask more specifically what would it 
take to fill D's bill. 
Let us try to make this platitudinous thought more explicit. 
" I owc this phrasc to Gidcon Roscn 
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Suppose we were, for a given domain D, to draw up a ‘job 
description’ for purported D-entities or D-properties - ‘D’s’ for 
short - based upon our ordinary notions, folk theories as influenced 
by scientific developments, relatively uncontroversial applications, 
paradigm cases, and so on.’* This job description is to be very 
literal-minded, that is, i t  attempts to express what D’s zf l i terulb 
understood are supposed to be and do. 
For example, a job description for physical object would include 
not only such minimal conditions as spatio-temporal location 
and continuity, but also all manner of humdrum activities and 
folk-scientific functions. Thus physical objects persist when un- 
observed; they non-circularly explain various features of our 
sensory experience; they have properties which enjoy a certain 
independence from our conceptions of them; and they include, as 
paradigms, rocks and trees; and so on. The presence in our 
intuitive job description for physical objects of these various 
elements is reflected in the fact that almost everyone views 
phenomenalism as a revisionary or non-literal account of our 
physical object discourse. 
.Job descriptions therefore are hardly free of folk-theorising. As 
we noted earlier, mental states are commonsensically supposed to 
be internal conditions of sentient beings that non-circularly explain 
their manifest behaviour. Analytic behaviourism thus is widely 
seen as a revisionary account of our mentalistic discourse. The 
Christian God is supposed to be a person-like entity with 
‘ I  This way of approaching things is obviously inspircd by the Ramscy-Carnap-I.cwis 
approach to dcfining thcorrtical tcrnis. (Srr, r.z., D. Ixwis, ‘How to Dcfinc Thcorctical 
Terms’, rcprintcd in his Phi/o.top/ticui Papen, vol. I [Nrw York: Oxfiml Univcrsity Press, 
19891.) Unlike the classic fornis ofthis approach, howrvrr, thcrc is no assumption hcrc that 
the job dcscription will bc ‘obsrrvational’ in the scnsr of being innocent of ‘thcorctical’ 
prcdicatc constants. Morcovcr, as in 1,cwis’s more rcccnt versions of this approach, it is 
assumcd that the job description is modified by a qualificr to thc cf‘cct that cntitics or 
propcrtics can mcrt thc drscription more or less l‘ully. 
I.cwis himsclf docs not ofkr this sort of account of moral terms ( S C C  his ‘Dispositional 
Thcorics of Valuc’, Proceedtn.<.r o j  the rlri.rtoteltnn Society suppl. vol. 63 [ 198Y]), preferring a 
more explicit dcfinition. Dcfcnding a Ramscy-Carnap-1,cwis approach to a class of tcrms 
rcquircs that the corrrsponding propcrtics purport to h a w  thc right sort and cxtcnt of 
thcorctical roles. Certainly this can t x  doub~cd in thc moral casc. I would argue that moral 
discourse is well-integrated into our fblk explanatory thcorics, which include countcrfactual- 
supporting gcncralisations linking ncrds and wants, gooda and fitnctions, virtucs and stablc 
personality traits, and rightness and social functionality ( S C C  for example thc discussion in 
P. Railton, ‘hforal Realism’, Philoiophical Rez,ieu. 87 ( 1  986) and ‘Naturalism and Prcscrip- 
tivity’, Soczul P/iilo.rophv and Poltry 7 (1989)). Thcsr thcorirs attempt to cxplain, among other 
things, both why wc sonictinics arrivr at moral knowlcdgc or  act wcll and why wc somctirncs 
do not.  
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extraordinary powers. An interpretation of ‘God exists’ as ‘I hereby 
commit myself to loving my neighbour’ would, I suspect, strike 
most theists as non-literal. 
Some elements of job descriptions are more epistemic in 
character. In the case of mental states, we take ourselves to have a 
kind of access to at least some of our own mental states that is more 
direct than our access to the mental states of others. In  the case of 
physical objects, we take ourselves to know something of them 
through experience. In the case of numbers, too, we take ourselves 
to know something of them, but with a special kind of certainty, 
and through means seemingly quite unlike those of ordinary 
observation. A radically empiricist interpretation of mathematics, 
like Mill’s, is to some degree epistemically revisionary. 
But to be revisionary is not to be wrong. Ordinary discourse is 
bound to contain not only vagueness and ambiguity, but inconsist- 
encies, incoherences, impossibilities. Ordinary discourse shows the 
sedimentation and metamorphosis of centuries of folk, scientific, 
and quasi-scientific thought, and any account free of ambiguity and 
incoherence is bound to be somewhat revisionary. Job descriptions 
are literal, but it seldom is possible that they be literally met when 
fully spelled out. They are meant to map out explicitly the intuitive 
landscape toward which philosophical accounts are directed, 
alternatively claiming with pride to capture large tracts of terrain 
or arguing defensively that those parts they cannot fit are best got 
rid of. 
Any such attempt at explicitness about what is uncontroversial is 
itself of course bound to be somewhat controversial, especially 
around the edges. Just how folk - as opposed to scientifically 
informed - a conception do we follow? And just which folk do 
we consult? Common sense is not regimented or homogenous. 
Consider ‘freedom of the will’. It certainly appears to be part of our 
commonsense conception of free will that free agents could have 
acted otherwise. But is it part of this conception - or a 
philosophical invention meant to explain it - that agents are able to 
act contra-causally? Moreover, in some languages the common- 
sense term is closer to ‘free choice’ than ‘free will’. Does our folk 
conception of free action involve commitment to the will as a little 
piece of machinery turning the psychic gears inside the agent? O r  
would a belief-desire-based model of choice more typical of 
contemporary psychology suffice?“ I t  will always be an essential 
’ ’  I am gratcful hcrc to Jean-Picrrc Dupuy 
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part of revisionist strategy to claim that what seems to some to be 
part of the intuitive landscape is really a mirage or a philosophical 
excrescence. 
IV 
With these caveats about ‘reading off job descriptions from 
common sense or expecting them to be fully met in mind, let us ask 
what the job listing for moral properties might look like. This is a 
fairly broad terrain, including properties as diverse as those of 
obligation, value, and character. To give the full listing would 
involve a large number of more or less interdependent job 
descriptions. Moreover, moral properties are asked to do a lot of 
things. We cite them in deliberation, assessment, interpretation, 
instruction, punishment, prediction, and explanation. Their job 
descriptions would be complex, and much intertwined with other 
elements of commonsense thought. A moral realist need not be 
non-revisionary with respect to the whole lot. And a moral realist 
need not be a realist about the whole lot. Just as one can be a 
scientific realist about entities and events but not about probability 
or nomic necessity, one can be a moral realist about value and 
virtue but not duty and rights. 
Let us focus herein on questions of moral value and evaluation 
(rather than claims about moral duty, say), and pay special 
attention initially to some questions about explanation that have 
figured centrally in recent discussions of moral realism. And let us 
remember our larger purpose. Literal Truth about a domain D is 
committed to the idea that the job descriptions of enough central D 
entities or properties are sufficiently well met by conditions in the 
actual world to enable us to formulate some substantive truths 
about D’s as literally understood. Realism in turn involves Literal 
Truth. Does i t  necessarily involve a further demand that the 
entities and properties of D be of an independent or nonsubject-ive 
nature? 
Consider first the realist about the external world of physical 
objects. Our ordinary conception of physical objects has it that they 
affect not only consciously-formulated beliefs (‘I think we’ve struck 
a submerged reef‘) but also experiential states of a kind prior to 
conceptualised belief (‘We test to see if the newborn can follow a 
flashlight with his eyes’), non-experiential states of subjective 
beings ( ‘ I  always get freckles like this in the summer sun’), and 
radically nonsubject-ive states (‘The earth’s gravitational field 
@ Rlackwrll Publishers I.td 1995 
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holds the moon in its orbit’).14 As we noted earlier, it is all part of a 
day’s work for physical objects to have effects in the world 
unmediated by and independent of any conscious or subject-ive 
state. An interpretation of physical object discourse bold enough 
to deny this would be bound to be viewed as too revisionary to 
vindicate our ordinary notion. 
For this reason, nonsubject-ivity belongs to the job description of 
physical objects, and therefore is as much a commitment of Literal 
Truth about physical object discourse as it is an implication of 
realism about physical objects. To believe that at least some 
physical object statements, literally understood, are literally true, is 
not to accept any particular explanatory claims (except perhaps, 
with the usual qualifications, for paradigm cases). But i t  is to 
accept the existence of entities with this sort of explanatory 
potential as part of the furnishings of the actual world. 
Contrast the case of belief. Common sense has it that beliefs are 
the possessions of subjects, and never found in their absence. One 
would not know what to make of a demand that beliefs as such, as 
ordinarily understood, have an explanatory role in the cosmos 
independent of all consciousness and unmediated by thought or its 
embodiment. The chief explanatory roles figuring in the job 
description of belief concern the shaping of thought, inference, 
action, perception, expectation, emotion, dreams, and so on. The 
effects of beliefs on the wider, nonsubject-ive world are always 
mediated by these states and processes and their embodiment in 
subject-ive beings. T o  be sure, their embodiment itself can have 
unmediated effects on the nonsubject-ive world. The pattern of 
electrical activation of my neurons as I ponder how to turn a key in 
a stubborn lock subtly affects the electromagnetic field surrounding 
me. But beliefs ‘in their own right’ - beliefs as such rather than 
their embodying conditions - effect changes in the physical world 
only indirectly, thanks to their influential role in the lives of the 
subjects wherein they reside. 
A requirement that beliefs constitute a ‘prior and independent 
order’ or possess a ‘wide cosmological role’ would thus certainly 
not be part the conditions for Literal Truth about belief discourse. 
Might it be an additional condition necessary to move from Literal 
Truth to realism? Could a non-eccentric realist about belief afford 
to be so eccentrically nonsubject-ive about the nature of belief? In  
l 4  This bricf list follows Wright’s dcscription o f  ‘widc cosmological role’ in Truth and 
Objectivity, pp. 196-99. 
@ Rlackwell Publishers Ltd. 1995 
P E T E R  RATT.TON 270 
principle, a realist can espouse a tolerable revisionism, bending our 
ordinary conceptions in order to obtain a good enough fit overall. 
Yet it is hard to see what positive contribution would be made to 
the vindication of commonsense or scientific belief discourse by 
attempting to introduce beliefs without believers. 
More generally, it need be no part of the ambition of realism 
about a domain of discourse D to attribute to the entities or 
properties in D causal-explanatory roles or conditions that go 
beyond the roles and paradigm cases found among the 3ob listings’ 
of D. Of course, any given realist might insist upon such further 
roles in order to meet other philosophical desiderata. A naturalist 
might insist as a condition for a realist attitude toward D that a 
naturalistic reduction of D’s be in the offing, or that D’s win their 
way into our best scientific theories rather than remain at the level 
of commonsense explanatory frameworks. But this naturalistic 
condition would be a specific way of being a realist or motivating 
realism, not a requisite of realism in general. And no matter what 
stripe of realism is in question, it will tend to complicate the 
realist’s life to insist upon a role or standing for D’s that goes 
against the grain of the job listings for D. A starkly object-ivist view 
of so paradigmatically subject-ive a phenomenon as belief might 
more appropriately be viewed as a replacement theory rather than 
a form of realism. Similarly, the contemporary scientist who says 
that God is, for him, simply the laws of physics themselves is more 
likely to be seen as offering a substitute for traditional notions of 
God than a vindication of them. 
If we are to make sense of the question of realism about belief, 
then there must be a way of being a realist about subject-ive 
domains. But what of the notion that realism about a domain D is 
distinguished by its commitment to the ‘objective’ status of D’s? Is 
there nothing to this? Or,  could there be so little to realism? 
Beliefs are fundamentally subject-ive, given their jobs, but it 
must be kept in mind that the sense of ‘subject-ive’ is technical and 
stipulative. I t  is opposed not to ‘objective’, but to ‘object-ive’, that 
is, having to do essentially with nonsubject-ive entities - entities 
that lack a mind or point of view, entities that are not a locus of 
experience or intention. Knowledge, for example, is by its nature 
subject-ive since it involves belief. But though it therefore cannot be 
object-ive, it might well be objective. And so might belief and 
belief-attribution. Consider the ‘Attitude Test’ mentioned earlier.15 
Thcrc a rc  numerous dimensions to our none-too-well-understood notion ofohjectivity. 
Herc we will he concerned mostly with those aspccts rcllcctcd in the Atti tudc Tcst.  For a 
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Can we uniformly replace the purported explanatory role of beliefs 
by reference instead to what we take ourselves to believe, without 
any loss of explanation? Or does belief have the potential to support 
explanations even in the face of what we take ourselves to believe? 
According to a familiar strain of anti-realism about belief, there are 
no facts about what we believe which obtain ‘outside’ an 
interpretive scheme, so that the whole contribution of belief-talk to 
understanding human behaviour can be captured by talking 
instead of belief-attributions, norms of belief-attribution, and so on. 
Realists about belief, on the contrary, think that there are facts 
about what an individual believes that can contribute to the 
explanation of his behaviour in ways not dependent upon his 
interpretive scheme or ours. 
Realists here take their cue in part from commonsense thought 
about belief. We earlier noted that belief is commonsensically 
treated as an internal state of individuals that has a causal or quasi- 
causal role in shaping their conduct, sometimes consciously 
sometimes not. If common sense is right about belief, then belief 
attributions and interpretive schcmes are answerable to facts about 
the distribution of beliefs, not the other way around. Belief 
discourse would pass the Attitude Test and, to that extent, possess 
a kind of objectivity. Because its explanatory role is always 
mediated by subjects, belief has narrow explanatory scope; but 
because this role is not always mediated by self-conception or 
interpretation, belief can be an objective feature of the subject-ive 
part of the world. Philosophical approaches to belief that treat 
belief as radically indeterminate and interpretation-dependent 
deny that belief possesses this sort of objectivity, and therefore 
strike the man in the street as quite a novelty (at least in my 
experience), surprisingly at odds with a literal understanding what 
beliefs are supposed to be. Indeed, such approaches collide with 
our ordinary way of speaking of ourselves in profound ways, and 
even flirt with incoherence.’“ 
What, then of the moral case? If moral value were a something 
rather than a nothing, what sort of a something would it be? And 
fiillcr drscription of somc notions of objrctivity, scc P. Railton, ‘Marxism and Scicntific 
Objcctivity’, rcprintcd in R. Boyd, P. Gaspcr, and J. D. Trout (cds.), The Philosophy ufScience 
(Camhridgc: M I T  Prcss, 1991). 
“’ For rclcvant discussion of thc possiblc incohcrrncc ofanothcr sort of dcnial of I.itcral 
Truth about bclicfdiscoursc, scc P. Boghossian, ‘Thc Status of Contcnt’, Philosophical Review 
99 (1989). 
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what would i t  do, or help to explain? What would its paradigm 
cases be? Although it is no ambition of this paper to sketch out a 
complete idea of the job description of any moral property, we do 
need to ask: Would moral value be subject-ive, like belief? And, if 
so, would it be capable of (at least) the same sort of objectivity as 
belief? 
It certainly seems safe to say that moral value has essentially to 
do with subjects. Just as a world altogether without conscious 
beings would contain no beliefs, so would it lack moral phenomena. 
The development of moral philosophy throughout the modern 
period has been deeply influenced by Hume’s observation of a 
special connection between moral evaluation and action, and by 
Kant’s insistence that moral reasoning must be practical. The 
exact nature and modality of the connections between moral 
thought and the experiencc or agency of subjects are matters of 
continuing controversy within moral philosophy. But it is relatively 
uncontroversial that commonsense moral discourse supposes there 
to be some such connections - e.g., that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and 
that evaluation is normally associated with motivation - and that 
any satisfactory account of morality must somehow accommodate 
or otherwise explain these ties. We have numerous paradigm cases 
of moral value or rightness, but so far as I know none that concern 
wholly nonsubject-ive phenomena. l 7  
Since the job description is subject-ive in this way, there can be 
no question of Literal Truth or realism about moral properties as 
requiring a ‘prior and independent order’. Yet, according to either 
realism or Literal Truth, moral properties might nonetheless 
possess the sort of objectivity we found in the case of belief. 
Consider some examples of commonsense moral explanations. 
The injustice of segregation helps explain why it produced 
widespread alienation and discontent and an eventual movement 
for change. The honest decency of a colleague helps explain why 
she has come to be listened to with some care in controversial 
matters. The deviousness of a parent helps explain the insecurity of 
his child later in life. And so on. Such explanations are rough but 
informative. For example, we learn something when an observer 
attributes an important role in explaining a country’s repeated 
This is not true of valuc discourse in general. Evcn if aesthetic value must in the end be 
understood as somehow a relational matter involving subjects, still, many paradigm cases of 
objects possessing acsthctic valuc are inanimatc oblects. 
17 
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bouts of social instability to underlying injustices rather than to 
economic downturns or political factors alone. 
Such moral explanations - at least, when offered non- 
metaphorically - have narrow ambitions regarding cosmic scope. 
Their explanada are always in the first instance features of 
subjects.’* Subjects can of course go on in various ways to change 
the nonsubject-ive world - popular rebellions attributable in part 
to social injustice have, for example, led to changes in settlement 
patterns or agricultural practices with profound ecological effects. 
What matters most for our purposes, however, is that many moral 
explanations would pass the Attitude Test in the following sense: 
they could not be replaced without loss by an explanation 
adverting only to the moral beliefs of those involved. A social 
order’s injustice may produce alienation and dysfunction well 
before any articulated sense of its injustice surfaces within the 
population. A parent’s dishonesty may undermine the solidity of a 
child’s sense of self long before any glimmer of a moral critique of 
the parent emerges in the child’s mind - if indeed it ever does. 
These explanatory accounts are in the first instance unmediated by 
moral concepts or beliefs. I t  would be quite a different analysis of a 
situation to trace the origins of a child’s difficulties to the 
acceptance of a morally-conceptualised belief on his part that his 
father is behaving deceptively. 
Moral sceptics and nonfactualists will on general grounds refuse 
to take any moral explanation at face value, for they deny the 
existence of moral properties. If these purported explanations are 
at all informative, they will argue, it is because of what such 
accounts tell us indirectly about moral beliefs, accepted norms, and 
other non-moral conditions. But here we are addressing the 
philosopher who has already accepted Literal Truth in the moral 
case. And commonsense moral discourse, taken literally, is so 
thoroughly interwoven with commonsense theorising about human 
action, society, and history, that it seems an evident part of the full 
job description of moral properties for them to have various 
genuine explanatory roles. 
No full job description for moral virtue, for example, could 
leave i t  explanatorily inert. It is of the essence of virtue that 
’’ Wc set aside here, as we did in thc casc of belief, cxplanations couched entirely in terms 
of the conditions ofembodiment by subjcrts ofthc propcrtics in qucstion. Clcarly the ‘subjacent 
basc’ of moral propcrtirs, as R. M. Hare has called i t ,  can dircctly cxplain features of the 
world without subjcct-ivc rncdiation. 
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possession of a virtue would help explain constancies of individual 
behaviour across varying circumstances, and that variations 
in behaviour across individuals facing similar circumstances can be 
attributed to the presence or absence of virtues.” Moreover, it is of 
the essence of virtue-based explanations that they are objective in the 
sense discussed above - it is one’s underlying moral character, not 
simply one’s moral beliefs (and certainly not one’s beliefs about 
one’s character), that explains one’s conduct. The question of 
whether to accept certain moral explanations as objective therefore 
need not derive from concerns or reifying tendencies specific to 
realism at all. It is dificult to imagine acceptance of the literal truth 
of substantive claims involving moral virtues without acceptance of 
the idea that virtues afford some measure of objective explanation 
(at least to the extent of passing the Attitude Test). 
If differences over how fully moral properties can do their 
purported jobs - including their purported objective explanatory 
jobs - belong to the space of revisionism within Literal Truth as 
much as they do to realism, what sorts of differences might 
distinguish Literal Truth from moral realism? We have already 
seen that they cannot be differences over the subject-ive character 
of moral properties - that feature of moral job descriptions is 
sufficiently central to be common ground to all interpretations of 
moral discourse with any hope of avoiding error theory. Could it be 
that ‘realist’ is simply the self-description of choice of those who 
think that the job descriptions of moral properties can fairly fully be 
met - so that adopting the position Literal Truth while rejecting 
the label ‘moral realism’ would be a way of signalling that one 
thinks some substantial, but still tolerable, revisionism of common 
sense is called for? There is something to this thought, but not, I 
suspect, enough. More than likely, there will be self-described 
moral realists who are more revisionary with respect to ordinary 
moral discourse than some self-styled quietists who accept Literal 
Truth but balk at moral realism. 
Differences about the appropriateness of an attitude of realism 
toward the moral among those accepting Literal Truth will, I 
suspect, lie less in matters about whether to accept at  face value 
Thcsc features of discourse ahout moral virtuc tcstify both thr empirical contcnt and 
the cmpirical vulnerability of moral cxplanation. At lcast one important tcndcncy i n  
contemporary psychology is sceptical about thr cxistcncc of continuing traits of character 
capablc of  explaining patterns of constancirs and variability in individual conduct across 
situations. Src I,. Ross and R. Nisbctt, The Perton and the Situation (Philadelphia: Temple 
Univcrsity Press, 1994), csp. ch. 4. 
I < I  
@ Blackwell Puhlishrrs I.td. 1995 
SUBJECT-IVE AND OBJECTIVE 275 
moral explanations than in general interpretive questions about the 
metaphysical weight of terms like ‘cause’, ‘explain’, ‘property’, 
and ‘objective’. In any event, our concern about whether the job 
descriptions of moral properties - including the explanatory 
elements - can be met does not itself depend upon any ‘heavy- 
weight’ notion of ‘explain’ or ‘property’. What is at issue here is a 
matter common to Literal Truth and realism: whether a large 
constellation of platitudes, commonsensical practices, folk notions, 
imported scientific theorising, and paradigm cases can - to a 
tolerable degree - be found to be instantiated in this world. 
V 
Given the differences in job listings between the domain of physical 
objects and the moral domain, i t  is unsurprising that moral 
judgement is a different business from ordinary judgement about 
objects in the world around us. Moral properties could hardly do 
their job if they were radically object-ive, physical objects could 
hardly do their job if they were not. 
Belief furnishes us a model of how there can be a genuine issue of 
realism and objectivity concerning a subject-ive domain. But in 
emphasising the parallel between moral realism and realism about 
belief, I do not mean to suggest that moral realism must be a form 
of psychologism. For commonsense moral thought includes various 
roles for moral properties that are not obviously psychological. 
Most notably, there are the so-called normative roles of moral 
notions - the action-guiding character of terms like ‘ought’, ‘must’, 
and ‘good’. I t  is an open question whether any purely psychological 
theory can give an account of this normativity. 
Yet here, too, an interesting parallel with belief holds. For it is 
also an open question whether any purely psychological theory can 
give an account of belief. Beliefs are commonsensically attributed 
propositional content as well as causal roles. Moreover, these 
contents have correctness conditions that are commonsensically 
seen as objective in the sense that the content of one’s beliefs is not 
simply a matter of what one takes it to be - it is not a matter of 
idiosyncratic will, free stipulation, or spontaneous creation. If the 
job description of belief is to be met in its central elements, an 
essentially subject-ive state must be capable of possessing the sort 
of objective normativity embodied in correctness conditions. But 
the puzzle here does not arise from the fact that the state is sub- 
ject-ive as such. I t  is no more clear - on the contrary, it is a good deal 
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less clear - how a purely nonsubject-ive state of the world could be 
a bearer of content. If the feat of creating and embodying states 
with correctness conditions can be accomplished at all, i t  seems 
evident that subjects rather than mere objects will be the ones to do 
it. 
The puzzle is how they might do this: how subjects might, by 
doing what they do, place themselves within a normative frame- 
work that sustains a distinction between what is correct and what is 
done (including what is as a matter of fact taken to be correct). 
This is as much a puzzle in the case of belief as i t  is in the moral 
case, though not the same puzzle - morality is certainly to that 
extent different. And it  is a puzzle for Literal Truth even apart from 
realism. For if moral discourse or discourse about belief is to any 
significant degree literally true, then somehow we subjects must 
have brought objective normativity into being.'" 
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